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The New Copyright Law, Public
Broadcasting, and the Public
Interest: A Response to "Public
Broadcasting and the Compulsory
License"
By ERIc H. SMITH*
JAMES F. LIGHTSTONE**
In his commentary entitled Public Broadcasting and the Com-
pulsory License,' John J. Timmel, a Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)
attorney, endorses the notion that section 118 of the new Copy-
right Act2 interferes "with the traditional functioning of the copy-
right system and the artistic and economic freedom of those cre-
ators whose works are subject to its provisions."' Looked at as a
whole and with its underlying purposes in mind, section 118 does
no such thing. Rather than posing a threat to the freedom or com-
pensation of copyright owners, section 118 builds upon existing li-
censing mechanisms in the broadcasting area, secures compensa-
tion for copyright owners, and effectively balances the needs of
copyright owners and public broadcasting users.
The rights of copyright owners are not expressly provided for in
the Constitution; rather, the Constitution empowers Congress to
grant and limit rights to promote creativity, with the public inter-
est in mind.' In the words of the United States Supreme Court:
* Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Public Broadcasting Service, Washington,
D. C.; B.A., Stanford University, 1964; J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1967; M.A.,
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1969.
** Associate, Cowan, Liebowitz and Latman, P.C., New York, New York; Member, State
Bar of New York; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1976; J.D., New York University School
of Law, 1979.
1. Timmel, Public Broadcasting and the Compulsory License, 3 Comm/ENT L.J. 25
(1980)(hereafter cited as Timmel).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 118 (Supp. III 1979).
3. Timmel at 28.
4. "The Congress shall have the Power to Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
33
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The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution,
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private mo-
tivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad pub-
lic availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The imme-
diate effect of our copyright law is, to secure a fair return for an
"author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is by this incen-
tive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
"The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly," this Court has said, "lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."'
Congress has explicitly noted that "encouragement and support of
noncommercial broadcasting is [sic] in the public interest."'
In the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress determined that copyright
should not interfere with certain uses of works by nonprofit organi-
zations. Thus, for example, public broadcasting stations could
broadcast nondramatic musical works with neither permission nor
compensation for the performance of a composer's song.7 The Con-
gressional intent was clear: nonprofit uses are in the public interest
and should be encouraged by allowing such uses without clearance
and without compensation to copyright owners. The exemption for
nonprofit uses endured for sixty-seven years without a successful
constitutional attack.
It was under this "for profit" copyright system that noncommer-
cial educational broadcasting was born, developed, and subsequen-
tly flourished. When Congress began to consider a new copyright
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Twentieth-Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (citations omitted).
6. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1976).
7. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1076 (hereafter "Old Law"). In the
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 1965 REVISION BILL, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Part 6) 34 (House Comm.
Print 1965) (hereafter cited as SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT), the Register states that "a per-
formance of a nondramatic literary or musical work in a broadcast to the public by an edu-
cational or other nonprofit radio or television station is not an infringement of copyright
where, as is usually assumed to be true of such stations, no commercial element is involved
in its broadcasts." However, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP) has argued that public broadcasts are not noncommercial and thus the exemption
does not apply. See Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 928-29 (1975) (statement of ASCAP representative); see also Associated Music Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc., 141 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 766 (1944); Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 729-30 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
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law, it concluded that "the present blanket exemption has become
too broad in its application to the new conditions of today. . . ."
Realizing the public interest in, and the unique nature of, noncom-
mercial educational (now called "public") broadcasting, however,
Congress carved out several, more limited exemptions and limita-
tions (e.g., sections 110 and 112), including section 118.*
Congress decided that, while a limited exemption was still ap-
propriate for public broadcasting's instructional programs, it would
be unfair to continue to exempt uses of visual and nondramatic
musical and literary works in programs geared toward the general
public.10 At the same time, it realized that the imposition on public
broadcasting of the kind of copyright clearance systems created for
commercial broadcasters, with their associated administrative
costs, in addition to the new imposition of a fee," would prohibi-
tively burden public broadcasting, effectively reducing the use of
8. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra, note 7, at 21.
9. The new Act reflects a legislative decision to consider the content of a program and the
audience it is directed to, as well as the noncommercial character of the broadcaster, in
determining copyright liability: "The approach of the bill . . . is first to state the [copyright
owner's] public performance right in broad terms and then to provide specific exemptions
for educational and other nonprofit uses." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62
(1976). For example, section 110(2) provides an exemption for instructional broadcasting
applying only to "performance of nondramatic literary or musical work or display of a
work," and only where the transmission meets specific conditions. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2). Sec-
tion 114(b) allows the use of copyrighted sound recordings in public television and radio
programs where "distributed by or through public broadcasting entities without authoriza-
tion of the owner of the copyright in the sound recording," as long as "copies or pho-
norecords of said programs are not commercially distributed by or through public broad-
casting entities to the general public." 17 U.S.C. § 114(b). Section 112(b)_grants special
ephemeral recording privileges to a nonprofit organization which qualifies for the exemp-
tions under sections 110(2) or 114(b) just described. 17 U.S.C. § 112(b).
10. See S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1974). With respect to literary works,
Congress reached a compromise different from its approach to musical and visual works.
Because of the nature of nondramatic literary works and the fact that they are not used in
the same quantities in public broadcasting programs as musical and visual works, Congress
chose not to extend the compulsory license to use of nondramatic literary works. See 17
U.S.C. § 118(e)(1), H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1976), and note 19, infra.
11. In commercial broadcasting, performing rights payments to ASCAP and BMI are
based upon a percentage of gross revenue. Such revenue is generated from the sale of time
to advertisers. Public broadcasters believed that this approach to the establishment of a fee
was inappropriate for a noncommercial, nonprofit system and they so persuaded the Copy-
right Royalty Tribunal. See the Tribunal's final decision at 37 C.F.R. § 304.1 (1978). Be-
cause there was no existing "market" except the commercial market for establishment of a
fee, the Tribunal is an appropriate forum to take into account all the factors relevant to
establishing a fair fee. See Public Broadcasting Copyright Project Statement of Position
before the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, February 17, 1978. But see Statement of the Ameri-
can Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers Before the Copyright Royalty Tribunal,
February 17, 1978.
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these works and increasing the already great financial strains on
it."
Contrary to Mr. Timmel's comment that section 118 "perpetu-
ates" some kind of "unfair treatment,"" section 118 represents a
careful balance of these interests-a compromise whereby the art-
ist is compensated for use of his or her work while at the same
time public broadcasters still enjoy unhindered access to the vast
numbers of copyrighted works they need to fulfill their Congres-
sional and public mandate to provide high qqality educational and
public service programming. Further, Mr. Timmel's notion that
section 118 upsets the "traditional functioning of the copyright
system,"' could not be farther from the truth. For nonprofit
broadcasting, the traditional "copyright system" was characterized
by no permissions or compensation being required for nondramatic
uses. And, one need only recall that the 1909 law contained in sec-
tion 1(e), and the 1976 law continues in section 115, a compulsory
license for phonorecords." Thus, again contrary to Mr. Timmel's
assertions, compulsory licensing is not new to U.S. copyright law
and, of course, a copyright "exemption," like that which existed for
public broadcasting, is in practical effect nothing less than a com-
pulsory license, though without compensation. Finally, as will be
discussed in more detail later," as far as performing rights socie-
ties such as BMI are concerned," section 118 in effect creates a
market system almost identical to that under which they have
functioned for years and continue to function today.
Despite the copyright law's history of exemptions and compul-
sory licenses, Mr. Timmel implies that the proper regulatory ap-
proach to public broadcasting is basically full copyright liability.
While this represents an understandable point of view from a cop-
12. DRAFT SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN-
ERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1975 REVISION BILL (1975), p. VI-14.
13. Timmel at 30.
14. Id. at 28.
15. Section 115 grants a compulsory license for the recording of copyrighted material once
the copyright owner's first authorized distribution of the recorded material has occurred. 17
U.S.C. § .115. Other compulsory licensing provisions in the new law are Section 116, which
provides a compulsory license for the use of musical compositions in jukeboxes, and Section
111, which in general provides a compulsory license for the retransmission of copyrighted
works by cable systems.
16. See text accompanying note 21, infra.
17. There are three such societies: Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), and Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers, Inc. (SESAC).
36 [Vol. 3
RESPONSE TO COMPULSORY LICENSE
yright owner, it is in fact inconsistent with Congress's overall ap-
proach to the copyright law and fails to take into account, as Con-
gress did, the impact of a commercially-oriented copyright
clearance system on the needs and structure of public broadcast-
ing. The problems of imposing full copyright liability on each pre-
viously exempt public broadcasting station is exactly what Con-
gress foresaw and attempted to resolve when it created section 118.
Congress was aware that the licensing of performing rights in the
music industry has been under the control of the three performing
rights societies for some time. The concomitant and essential right
to license the right to record music ("synchronization rights"),
however, has traditionally been left to the thousands of individual
publisher members of these societies. Many, though not all, of the
individual members are affiliated with an umbrella organization,
The Harry Fox Agency.18 With respect to visual works, Congress
also realized that there are no centralized agencies; therefore, in
each case the copyright owner had to be identified and located,
and an individual license negotiated. Thus, Mr. Timmel's effort to
isolate "performing rights" ignores the critical fact that section 118
also covers essential works and rights going far beyond those han-
dled by BMI.
In addition, section 118 incorporates Congress's conclusion that
unlike the compulsory licenses for cable television (section 111),
the jukebox industry (section 116) and the record industry (section
115), where terms and rates are specified in the statute, it would be
inappropriate to set such terms in the case of public broadcasting.
Accordingly, Congress in section 118(b) required that the parties
enter into negotiations looking toward voluntary agreements. How-
ever, where such agreements are not achieved, this section, like the
consent decree for performing rights and the exemption in the old
law, continues to ensure that the user cannot be denied access to
the covered works.'9 Just as importantly, in such a case section 118
18. Unlike the performing rights societies, the Harry Fox Agency does not grant blanket
licenses. The right to record a musical work for broadcast, whether through Fox or not,
must be acquired on an individual, tune-by-tune basis, which can often require contacting
several publishers in several cities for several licenses for one program alone. Of course, in
the case of some "ephemeral" recordings, clearance of synchronization rights is exempted
under § 112. See 17 U.S.C. § 112(a).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 118(d). In addition, § 118 creates an antitrust exemption for literary works
permitting industry-wide negotiations and patterns designed to ease administrative bur-
dens. Arrangements were voluntarily negotiated between public broadcasting and the Asso-
ciation of American Publishers and the Authors League of America. They involve a recom-
mended standard license, standard rates and fair use guidelines. See REGISTER OF
No. 1] 37
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empowers one specialized, ongoing forum-the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal-to resolve disputed rates and terms for all the rights
public broadcasters need. Thus, one body can continuously oversee
the balance between the needs of public broadcasters and the
rights of copyright owners. Further, with respect to performing
rights, all parties are saved the expense of going from one forum to
another, with necessarily inconsistent decisions, for adjudication of
the interests involved.20
Interestingly enough, the effect of all this on BMI (and ASCAP
as well) is basically nothing more than a shift of forum for settling
disputes on rates and terms in the absence of a voluntary agree-
ment. Under its consent decree with the United States," BMI
must grant, upon request, a license at a reasonable rate for rights
in the nondramatic musical works it controls; far and away the li-
cense most frequently granted is a blanket license for all works in
BMI's repertoire. The situation is, in effect, a mandatory license
for all BMI works-just as under section 118. The only significant
difference between the situations from the BMI perspective, then,
is whether, in the absence of a voluntary agreement," the matter is
settled by arbitration or before the Tribunal. And, since ASCAP
disputes are settled in Federal court, if the jurisdiction over per-
forming rights or any other set of rights were to be taken away
from the Tribunal, the number of forums in which disputes would
be settled would be expanded from one to three (if SESAC is in-
cluded as well). Clearly this result would frustrate the dual pur-
pose of avoiding additional and unnecessary expense for public
broadcasters and of vesting one body with the power to oversee the
delicate balance between the conflicting rights and needs involved.
COPYRIGHTS, PUBLIC BROADCASTING REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS,
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print
1980).
20. Public broadcasters presented to Congress the long history of costly litigation between
commercial broadcasting and the performing rights societies to resolve disputes. And, with
respect to synchronization rights and visual works, without § 118 there would be no forum
at all to resolve disputes. If rates and terms could not be agreed upon, a public broadcaster
would not be able to use the work.
21. United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc. 35 Copy. Dec. 870 (S.D.N.Y.1966); see also the
consent decree against ASCAP in United States v. ASCAP, 32 Copy. Dec. 601 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
22. Timmel does not mention that in 1978 BMI and public broadcasting successfully
reached a negotiated, voluntary agreement including provisions to adjust the rate every year
based upon relative use of BMI music. Thus, BMI did not even have to appear before the
Tribunal.
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In any event, Mr. Timmel's argument that, without section 118,
copyright owners would be able to license rights "freely and with-
out compulsion"" is, at least in the context of performance rights
in nondramatic musical works, quite simply inaccurate in light of
the consent decree.
The point to be remembered is that section 118 was designed to
serve the public interest. As a practical matter, without the section
118 clearance and payment system, a broadcaster/producer's ad-
ministrative clearance expenses would multiply, especially as he or
she sought to clear, on a work-by-work basis, synchronization
rights and rights in photographs and other visual works. Moreover,
failure either to identify or locate owners, to acquire the necessary
extended use rights, or otherwise to reach a mutually satisfactory
arrangemment under tight production schedules would inevitably
lead to less program availability and inferior program quality. Such
a result would in many instances be detrimental to authors whose
works are not used and who are therefore not compensated. In
view of this potentially stifling effect upon public broadcasting's
ability to make artistic works generally available-a right previ-
ously guaranteed under the prior complete exemption-the re-
moval of section 118 would greatly disserve the public.
The importance of section 118 is further underscored by the fact
that the rights and works involved are more important day-to-day
to public broadcasters than to their commercial counterparts. This
is true because the vast bulk of programs in commercial broadcast-
ing (entertainment programs) do not use a significant amount of
preexisting copyrighted works, works which form the backbone of
public broadcasting." Moreover, local commercial broadcasters do
comparatively little of their own production. Instead they obtain
most of their programs from the networks or from syndication. Lo-
cal public broadcasters, with minimal resources and staff, regularly
produce documentaries, current affairs and cultural programs,
which, unlike local commercial productions, require not only regu-
lar access to copyrighted works, but rights which permit repeated
use of programs containing those works."
23. Timmel, at 29.
24. Programs, for example, on the history of music, on the history of art, and on photog-
raphy are routinely produced in public broadcasting. In contrast, quiz and game shows,
sports and serials do not normally include preexisting copyrighted material.
25. Because of public broadcasting's patterns of repeating programs, synchronization
rights are necessary for most music used in programs other than music specially composed
for the program. Public broadcasters are not in as strong a financial position to commission
No. 1] 39
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Were clearance requirements akin to those applicable to com-
mercial broadcasting to be imposed wholesale on public broadcast-
ing, a public television station in Idaho or Utah, for example,
would be required to clear individually each preexisting copy-
righted musical work in its programs through the Harry Fox
Agency in New York or with the individual publisher. Clearing vis-
ual works would pose an even more difficult problem. Section 118
remedies these difficulties by, in effect, permitting use of the work
without prior clearance and establishing a mechanism for fair com-
pensation. The section also acts as an indispensable incentive to
the music and visual works industries to form comprehensive vol-
untary licensing mechanisms.
The key problem with Mr. Timmel's argument is evident in his
statement that "the programming needs of public broadcasting for
performing rights could be fully met by blanket licensing arrange-
ments. . . ."" This statement misses the mark: section 118 is in-
tended-in addition to compensating copyright owners-to create
a simplified backdrop against which public broadcasters can clear
the necessary performance and synchronization rights in nondra-
matic musical works, as well as broadcast rights in visual works.
Section 118 ensures unhindered access by public broadcasters to
the works they need to fulfill their unique programming mission,
while at the same time providing fair compensation to copyright
owners, all regardless of changes in the structure of the music and
visual works industries. Not only is there no compelling reason to
amend the law, but any move which would change this system as
to performing rights or any other right or work, would disserve
public broadcasting, copyright owners and, most importantly, the
American public.
original music or visual works as are commercial broadcasters.
26. Timmel at 27.
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